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The Heteronomy of Choice Architecture 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6, no. 3 (2015): 495-509. 
 
Abstract 
 
Choice architecture is heralded as a policy approach that does not coercively 
reduce freedom of choice. Still we might worry that this approach fails to respect 
individual choice because it subversively manipulates individuals, thus 
contravening their personal autonomy. In this article I address two arguments to 
this effect. First, I deny that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous. I 
explain the reasons we have for avoiding heteronomous policy-making and offer 
a set of four conditions for non-heteronomy. I then provide examples of nudges 
that meet these conditions. I argue that these policies are capable of respecting 
and promoting personal autonomy, and show this claim to be true across 
contrasting conceptions of autonomy. Second, I deny that choice architecture is 
disrespectful because it is epistemically paternalistic. This critique appears to 
loom large even against non-heteronomous nudges. However, I argue that while 
some of these policies may exhibit epistemically paternalistic tendencies, these 
tendencies do not necessarily undermine personal autonomy. Thus, if we are to 
find such policies objectionable, we cannot do so on the grounds of respect for 
autonomy.  
 
Keywords: Heteronomy, Choice Architecture, Personal Autonomy, 
Epistemic Paternalism. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Choice architecture (or nudging) is an approach to policy design that seeks to 
harness evidence from behavioural economics and cognitive psychology to 
overcome blunders we commonly make in our decision-making. These include a 
reliance on heuristics (such as anchoring, availability, and representativeness) 
and biases toward unrealistic optimism, preservation of the status quo, loss 
aversion, and vulnerability to framing effects (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, pp. 24-
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40).1 Sometimes these phenomena are harmless and we employ them as 
shortcuts in our everyday practical reasoning without problem. However, 
sometimes these phenomena lead to suboptimal outcomes, not only in terms of 
some objective measure of value, but even according to our own subjective 
standards of success. We act as boundedly-rational agents, sometimes to our 
detriment. 
 
Once identified, policy-makers face a choice about how to design policies in light 
of these cognitive shortcomings. A nudge is a particular type of policy which 
seeks to bring about beneficial ends by either exploiting or preventing these 
biases. Some nudges are paternalistic because they are intended to promote the 
well-being of the subject because he or she is judged incapable of doing so 
themselves.2 These nudges, offered under the banner of libertarian paternalism, 
are a specifically motivated subset of choice architecture. These policies face 
questions about the legitimacy of both their means and their ends.  
 
However not all nudges are paternalistic. Some are intended to overcome 
collective action problems, prevent large-scale harms or bring about socially just 
outcomes. For example, nudges may be designed to increase organ-donation, 
combat climate change, or reduce discrimination in the work place. As these 
policies seek to aid third-parties (even after the death of the subject in some 
instances) they are cases of non-paternalistic nudging. Here I am interested in 
this latter group of policies. By engaging with these cases I seek to avoid 
recycling many of the traditional concerns about paternalism. Instead I am 
assuming the legitimacy of the government’s aims and questioning whether the 
use of choice architecture as a means to securing these legitimate aims is 
necessarily disrespectful toward personal autonomy.  
 
                                                 
1 In his most recent work on choice architecture, Sunstein (2014b, pp. 34-50) describes these 
phenomena as ‘behavioural market failures’. He groups these into four distinct sets: 1) present 
bias, time inconsistency and inter-temporal internalities; 2) saliency and shrouded attributes; 3) 
unrealistic optimism; and 4) problems with probability and availability. 
2 Here I characterise paternalism as a motivational wrong. This characterisation is contestable. 
For more on the plausibility of this characterisation and paternalism’s justificatory burden, see 
Mills 2013b. 
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In response to this question I seek to develop and defend a prior claim that some 
instances of choice architecture are not only compatible with personal autonomy, 
but can promote it (Mills 2013a). To defend this claim I begin by outlining our 
reasons for avoiding heteronomous policies (§2). I then discuss four features of 
nudging that are salient to autonomy-based concerns and explain why they 
should lead us to believe that some instances of choice architecture are non-
heteronomous (§3). I show this claim to be compatible with contrasting 
conceptions of personal autonomy and, further, how it can be extended to the 
promotion of autonomy (§4). I then propose a related epistemic criticism of 
nudging that threatens to undermine the claim that nudging respects 
autonomous choice (§5). I defuse this argument before briefly concluding (§6). 
 
2. Choice Architecture and Personal Autonomy 
 
The normative standard most commonly employed to assess the permissibility 
of choice architecture is the preservation of freedom of choice. Libertarian 
proponents of choice architecture emphasise that nudges preserve freedom of 
choice because individual choices are not coercively restricted. This claim has 
been a major selling-point of the approach and is responsible for much of its 
initial popularity with policy-makers. However this standard of permissibility 
faces a number of concerns. First, whether relatively opaque non-coercive 
influences are all things considered preferable to more transparent but more 
coercive efforts is unclear (e.g. Conly 2013, pp. 29-36). Further, the truth of the 
non-coerciveness claim hinges on the libertarian tendency to favour thin, 
negative conceptions of freedom. As a result, it may not hold across all 
conceptions of freedom. (Goodwin 2012, p. 88; Grüne-Yanoff 2012, p. 638).  
 
My concern differs from this line of critique. Even if choice architecture does 
preserve liberty, this does not fully vindicate the method as respectful toward 
the choices of autonomous agents. We ought to concern ourselves with more 
than the number of options facing individuals. We should also consider the 
quality of those options and the individual’s ability to reflect on these options in 
an authentic fashion. These autonomy-based concerns are at least equally 
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important as those concerning freedom of choice, but they have enjoyed far less 
detailed analysis.3 
 
Personal autonomy is the capacity for an individual to determine and pursue her 
own conception of the good according to her own will.4 There are a range of 
reasons why we might value this capacity instrumentally (e.g. we might think it 
good for a stable and progressive society). Further, we might value it intrinsically 
(e.g. as a necessary component of well-being or meaningful agency). Given this 
range of reasons, autonomy is often thought to be worthy of respect and to play a 
central role in our everyday moral conduct (e.g. Dillon 1995; Hill Jr. 2000; 
Kerstein 2013).  
 
If we recognise the value of autonomy, reflecting on its content provides us with 
clear guidelines for respecting others. Although consensus on this reflection is 
not unanimous (more on this in §4), there is widespread agreement that the 
autonomous pursuit of the good requires a distinct combination of internal and 
external conditions. The internal conditions of personal autonomy primarily 
concern an individual’s competency at decision-making and her independence 
from internal authenticity-threatening factors (e.g. phobias). The external 
conditions of personal autonomy primarily concern the quality of her options 
and her independence from external authenticity-threatening factors (e.g. 
coercion). Recognising these factors allows us to identify situations where 
respect for personal autonomy is at risk, and debate over how these factors are 
best fleshed out allows us to better employ respect for autonomy as a standard 
for permissibility. 
 
Acknowledging the value of autonomy gives us reason to avoid heteronomy. 
Heteronomous behaviour can be caused by any reason for action that motivates 
                                                 
3 This is partly due to Sunstein and Thaler’s repeated refusal to engage at any great length with 
autonomy as an intrinsically valuable consideration (Sunstein & Thaler 2003, p. 1167, n. 22; 
Sunstein 2014b, p. 134). For the most detailed attempt, see Sunstein forthcoming. 
4 For more on the various other ways we might define personal autonomy (and whether it can be 
characterised in one single way), see Feinberg 1989. 
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an individual contrary to (e.g. by overriding or subverting) their authentic will.5 
Heteronomy specifically threatens the independence of an individual’s will by 
disregarding her decision-making competency, thus bypassing part of what 
makes her decision her own. It is whether choice architecture shows this 
particularly disrespectful characteristic that concerns us. If it does, then even 
non-paternalistic nudges threaten a pro-tanto wrong against the subject. This 
would severely weaken the case for nudging. 
 
Critics may suggest that choice architecture is necessarily heteronomous 
because it seeks to exploit heuristics and cognitive biases in our reasoning. 
Accordingly, choice architects pursue a programme of manipulation that 
undermines the independence of an autonomous agent’s will by subverting the 
flaws in her decision-making competency to bring about particular outcomes. 
Even though nudges may leave the number of options in a subject’s choice set 
unchanged, the choice architect exerts objectionable pressure on the individual’s 
will to direct her behaviour within that choice-making scenario (e.g. Bovens 
2009, p. 209; Hausman & Welch 2010, p. 28; Wilkinson 2013, p. 347; White 2013, 
p. 95). If the subject acts as the choice architect intends due to the pressure they 
experience (i.e. if the nudge succeeds), then the nudge undermines her autonomy 
by contravening the independence condition. In what follows, I contest two 
versions of this objection. 
 
3. The Salient Characteristics of Choice Architecture 
 
If the charge of heteronomy was true then choice architecture would be 
objectionable on grounds of respect for autonomy. The charge arises because the 
success of choice architecture relies on the very pressure that troubles critics. To 
                                                 
5 On a strictly Kantian definition, heteronomous motivation is based on an impulse foreign from 
our reason, including inclinations (Kant 2012, 4:444). As such impulses do not originate from our 
rational will they prevent us from self-legislation. Further, because such impulses are not 
necessarily shared by all rational agents, they cannot justify universal categorical imperatives. 
This Kantian understanding of heteronomy is slightly narrower than the one that motivates my 
concern. Kantians interpret heteronomy through their interest in the possibility of moral 
autonomy and universal categorical moral obligations. I am merely concerned with sources of 
reasons for action that override the capacity for personal autonomy and I adopt the term with 
this broader usage in mind. 
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defuse this objection it must be shown that the pressure required for a nudge to 
be effective need not be heteronomous. To do this we must show that a policy 
can influence the subject’s decision (e.g. counterfactually if the nudge were not in 
place the individual would have chosen differently) but that this influence does 
not entirely override her reasoning nor circumvent her decision-making 
competency. Previously, I have briefly sketched such an argument (Mills 2013a). 
If successful, it suggests that this criticism is too quick and that some instances of 
choice architecture can be both successful and non-heteronomous. Here I seek to 
develop and defend this argument, which revolves around four characteristics 
first suggested by Thaler and Sunstein as characteristics of good nudging. These 
characteristics, I suggest, are salient to respect for autonomy and should calm 
critics’ worries. 
 
The first characteristic is that choice architecture should be primarily intended to 
facilitate an individual’s pursuit of her own goals (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, pp. 5-
6).6 This ensures that nudges must allow the subject significant freedom to select 
and pursue her own authentically adopted ends. This characteristic is crucial. It 
ensures that the subject’s will becomes the lodestar for good nudge design, 
giving the policy-maker reason to design nudges that facilitate a subject’s 
otherwise thwarted attempts at autonomous action. For example, such policies 
might reduce the subject’s exposure to misinformation or offer helpful 
suggestions of ways of achieving their goals, thus aiding authentic behaviour. So 
long as the nudge tracks the subject’s autonomous will (and does not contravene 
it) the nudge will avoid heteronomy.  
 
Critics may object, however, to the difficulties of designing such policies. This 
condition requires the choice architect to have epistemic access to an 
individual’s subjective standards. White suggests that the evidence required is 
unlikely to be available, thus leading the policy-maker into an objectionable 
process of value substitution (White 2013, pp. 64-79). Rebonato suggests the 
stronger claim that nudging in-line with an individual’s own preferences is 
                                                 
6 This ensures that when employed paternalistically, nudges are instances of means paternalism 
rather than ends paternalism (Sunstein 2014b, p. 19). 
7 
 
impossible for the very reason that allows nudging in the first place – the split 
nature of our reasoning (Rebonato 2012, pp. 153-158). The distinction between 
systems of reasoning that nudging takes for granted ensures that the architect 
cannot take an individual’s decisions at face value. Some decisions will be 
blunders and others will not. Because of this, the validity of the subject’s 
preferences is opaque to both the architect and the subject. How can we design 
policies that use the subject’s tendency toward blunders to help her authentic 
decision-making when neither the architect nor the subject can be sure which 
decisions represent which?  
 
The response to this problem has two parts. In the first instance, the philosopher 
can help. What distinguishes blunders from non-blunders is whether the 
decision furthers our subjective standard of success. That is, whether they are 
authentic to our conception of the good. So to design an effective and respectful 
nudge, we must identify cognitive factors that lead us to inauthentic blunders 
and seek to compensate for their presence. This requires our policy to reference 
a compelling account of authenticity e.g. one based on volitional necessities 
(Frankfurt 1982; 1998; Watson 2004) or coherence of preferences (Ekstrom 
1993; 2005a; 2005b; 2010). To illustrate, we might design a choice prompt that 
asks choosers to consider what outcomes they feel that they could not live 
without or how their decision will compare to those that they usually make. 
These simple questions nudge the subject to consider her current decisions 
against her authentic motivations and preferences. With an account of 
authenticity in hand, the choice architect can come to understand which of the 
subject’s decisions are blunders and which are not. If their policies enable (or do 
not prevent) authentic decisions, then their policies pass the test of effectiveness 
and respect. 
 
Taking the second step of putting this into practice will likely require us to draw 
on the psychology of debiasing. Debiasing techniques are designed to help shrink 
the distance between systems of reasoning by drawing a subject’s attention to 
present biases, rather than influencing her behaviour by replacing one bias with 
another (e.g. Jolls & Sunstein 2006; Pi et al. 2014). Such techniques are central to 
8 
 
reducing instances of unreflective blunders because they help the subject to 
identify and reflect on influences on their reasoning. When combined with an 
account of authenticity, debiasing techniques will allow the policy-maker to 
reduce decisions that the subject deems alienating, further aiding their 
autonomy (Trout 2005, p. 414).  
 
The second salient characteristic is that choice scenarios should be designed to 
include an acceptably low opt-out cost.7 This will allow the subject to avoid the 
policy if they feel threatened by its pressure or do not will the intended outcome. 
This characteristic requires the nudge to be both effective and easily avoided if 
the subject so desires, adding an additional test to contend with. Rebonato 
suggests that nudges cannot be both effective and avoidable (2013, pp. 200-209). 
This is because the effectiveness of choice architecture relies on a functional 
distinction between nominal and real freedom of choice. For a nudge to be 
successful, it must exert pressure in a way that reduces real freedom of choice, 
leaving only a nominal form of freedom of choice in its place:  
 
‘So, if the nudges of the libertarian paternalists – such as changing the 
default option – are effective, and exploit the decisional inertia of the 
choosers, then it makes little difference that there is a nominal right to 
opt out. And if their nudge is very effective, then having the nominal 
right to reverse the nudge makes very little difference’. (Rebonato 
2013, p. 203, italics original).  
 
Rebonato is correct to identify the possible tension between effectiveness and 
avoidability as relevant to the normative assessment of nudging. However, he 
mischaracterises this tension because of the ambiguity in how we might 
characterise the opt-out clause and its relationship with autonomy. To respect 
autonomy, nudges need to be avoidable rather than reversible (Sunstein 2014b, p. 
60). Choice architects should ensure that there is a negligible cost to opting out 
(i.e. one that does not impair the voluntariness of an individual’s actions) rather 
                                                 
7 For an interesting argument concerning how the opt-out clause may combine with the 
intentions of the choice architect, see Wilkinson 2013, pp. 351-353. 
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than a non-negligible cost that can be compensated for or reversed at a later date. 
Reversibility allows a coerciveness in nudging (that directly contravenes the 
independence condition of autonomy) that avoidability does not.  
 
With this clarification in mind we can see that the tension that Rebonato 
identifies does not prohibit all forms of choice architecture. A tension between 
effectiveness and avoidability exists when the aim of a nudge runs contrary to an 
individual’s will. In this scenario the effective aim of the nudge differs from the 
subject’s wishes, putting it in tension with the subject’s desire to opt-out. If a 
choice architect attempts to alter individual behaviour in that manner, 
avoidability (via an opt-out) would be required to ensure respect for choice. But, 
as Rebonato suggests, the effectiveness of the nudge ensures that the individual 
cannot make use of the opt-out because the nudge undermines her reflective 
capacity. This is one way that heteronomous nudges fail to respect personal 
autonomy; either i) the policy succeeds and the individual wanted to opt-out but 
could not, or ii) the policy fails because the individual opts out.  
 
However, as the previous characteristic suggests, not all nudges do this. Both the 
aim of the policy and how the policy achieves that aim matters here. 
Effectiveness is not determined by a single measure of pressure on the will but 
rather by a pluralistic measure of affective influence. Nudges affect our 
behaviour in more than one way. A distinction between types of influence can 
determine whether a policy is heteronomous or not (Blumenthal-Barby 2013, p. 
192). As a result, there are various types of influence available to choice 
architects that allow nudges to be both effective and non-heteronomous. When a 
policy effectively constrains an individual’s authentic pursuit of her goals, 
Rebonato’s tension is pervasive but when such policies effectively facilitate her 
pursuit of her own goals, Rebonato’s tension dissolves. As such, the opt-out 
condition gives the subject extra defence against poorly designed nudges by 
making it less likely that they will be effective. In contrast, well designed nudges 
(e.g. according to the previous characteristic) will not generate this tension. 
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The final constraints on the permissibility of nudging are provided by a pair of 
conditions - publicity and transparency. Thaler and Sunstein commit themselves 
to a loose Rawlsian principle of publicity (Thaler & Sunstein 2008, pp. 244-245). 
Rawls’ publicity condition is part of his social contract approach to establishing 
principles of justice and, as such, is intended to represent part of the value of 
agreement over moral principles.8 Although nudges do not require actual 
consent, publicity is relevant to ensuring respect for autonomy.9 There are two 
ways of interpreting this requirement: 
 
In its stronger form, publicity acts as the basis for Rawls’ public justification 
requirement (Rawls 2001, pp. 26-29; Rawls 2005, p. 226; Thaler & Sunstein 
2008, p. 245). This condition concerns the policy-maker’s ability and willingness 
to justify her policies to those affected. It restricts the range of reasons that 
policy-makers can permissibly appeal to down to those that other individuals 
can reasonably be expected to endorse. If an instance of choice architecture is to 
meet this stronger constraint, the choice architect must have reasons for the 
intervention that they believe others are likely to share.10 
 
In its weaker form, a commitment to publicity entails some form of transparency. 
Publicity requires the individuals affected to understand the policy as if they had 
agreed to it even if they haven’t actually done so. This requires that the decisions 
                                                 
8 In Rawls’ original expression of his theory, he states that according to the publicity condition: 
‘The parties assume that they are choosing principles for a public conception of justice. They 
suppose that everyone will know about these principles all that he would know if their 
acceptance were the result of an agreement. Thus the general awareness of their universal 
acceptance should have desirable effects and support the stability of social cooperation.’ (Rawls 
1971, p. 133). Larmore suggests the following interpretation: ‘The point is that just as the validity 
of a contract does not turn solely on the terms agreed to, but also on the fact of agreement, so 
justice consists in more than the proper distribution of rights and assets. Principles of justice 
should also be public, each of us affirming them in light of the fact that others affirm them 
too….Equally important is the publicity of its defining principles – that our reason for accepting 
them turns on others having reason to accept them too.’ (Larmore 2002, p. 370, italics original). 
9 For the claim that consensual nudging respects personal autonomy, see Wilkinson 2013, p. 353. 
10 This invites us to think more closely about the relationship between choice architecture and 
public reason. Such reflection is sadly outside of the scope of this paper; however two points are 
worth mentioning here. First, the relationship between choice architecture, publicity and public 
reason may not be as strong as implied (as our publicity condition could take a non-Rawlsian 
form). Second, Rawlsians may object to choice architecture as a policy method that fails to treat 
citizens as free and equal (Rawls 2001, pp. 18-24; Rawls 2005, pp. 29-35). 
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of policy-makers must be open and scrutable. This transparency ensures that an 
individual is aware of the nudges that they encounter. As Bovens suggests, such 
transparency can take one of two forms: type and token interference 
transparency (2009, p. 216; see also Grüne-Yanoff 2012, p. 638; Blumenthal-
Barby 2013, p. 191). Type interference concerns the form a policy might take. 
Token interference concerns which choice scenarios have been interfered with. 
These can be separated: I might know that a particular type of nudging is 
employed by an institution (type) but not know when and where I encounter it 
(token), or I might know that a particular choice situation is designed with a 
specific end in mind (token) but be unaware of the full range of nudges employed 
to achieve it (type).  
 
Transparency compliments the second characteristic: to maximise avoidability, 
an intervention must be transparent in both ways. As with avoidability, it might 
be argued that transparency is in tension with effectiveness. By its very nature, 
the transparency condition reduces the opacity of permissible polices. If opacity 
is required for the success of certain nudges, then a tension may exist. Thus, a 
commitment to conditions of publicity and transparency is also a commitment to 
the idea that not all nudges need to be hidden to be effective.  
 
Interpreted in this manner, I suggest that the normative guidance on the 
permissibility of interference contained within the most popular expression of 
choice architecture can rebut criticisms of heteronomy. So long as a nudge: a) is 
in line with a competent individual’s authentically preferred ends, b) is easily 
avoidable, c) meets some form of publicity condition, and d) meets conditions of 
transparency, then that policy does not pose a threat to personal autonomy.  
 
This is a high bar to clear, but I believe that the following types of policies meet 
these standards and thus offer choice architects an effective response to our 
concern: 
 
i) Personalisable Default Rules – central to choice architecture, the idea that 
there is no neutral choice (sans any influence) is reflected in policies that 
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determine what should occur if an individual does nothing. Often relying 
on inertia, if such rules could be neither controlled nor avoided by the 
subject they would pose a substantial threat to her autonomy. However, if 
the default rules are personalisable (so that they can be shaped by the 
subject), and contain opt-outs (so that they can be avoided by the subject), 
then they can be designed to help the subject protect herself from errant 
preferences that she believes distract her from her pursuit of the good 
(Sunstein 2014b, p. 99). 
 
ii) Choice Prompts – sometimes known as active choosing, choice prompts 
are a type of default rule that prompt an individual to choose (Sunstein 
2014b, p. 95). So long as an individual is not cognitively overwhelmed by 
such prompts (Dworkin 1988, pp. 78-81) these policies can increase the 
number of opportunities for autonomous choice and may improve the 
subject’s competency at such decisions. 
 
iii) Framed Information Provision – the selective disclosure of information to 
the subject can be designed to improve her decision-making according to 
her own subjective standards (Sunstein 2014b, pp. 139-140). This may 
include providing specific information about particular means toward the 
subject’s chosen end. The provision of information reduces epistemic 
costs for action and respects autonomy by engaging (rather than 
bypassing) the subject’s will.11  
 
4. Extending the Argument 
 
In the previous section I argued that guidelines concerning respect for autonomy 
can be applied to choice architecture to validate some nudges as non-
heteronomous. To make this claim, I characterised autonomy as a form of 
authentic self-rule. As this characterisation of autonomy is contestable, my 
argument will be strengthened if it could be shown as plausible over contrasting 
                                                 
11 In contrast, framing effects intended to subvert the subject’s will impose an epistemic cost on 
their behaviour. For more on the implications of this for consent, see Hanna 2011. 
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conceptions of autonomy. In this section, I seek to illustrate that my argument is 
sound according to accounts of autonomy that both accept and deny authenticity 
a central role. Further, I will extend my claim to argue that choice architecture is 
not only compatible with personal autonomy, it may also promote it.12 
 
Those who accept authenticity as a core value of autonomy (as I have) tend to 
characterise autonomy as a process of motivational reflection to locate the 
authentic self, and then the privileging of authentically motivated actions over 
others. A seminal example of this approach is Frankfurt’s (1971) account, which 
suggests that autonomous behaviour is best characterised by the agent’s role in 
determining the relationship between their various volitions (i.e. effective 
desires that successfully motivate an agent to act). In its simplest form, his 
account relies on a hierarchy of desires (i.e. first-order, second-order and so on) 
which captures our capacity for motivational reflection and the sense of agential 
control that this capacity grants us. Frankfurt suggests that autonomous actions 
are those that follow from second-order volitions; desires about desires that 
successfully motivate us to act. Accordingly, autonomous behaviour consists in 
an agent successfully acting from a desire that he or she wants to want to act 
from. Frankfurt has since developed this account, and alternatives to his 
approach differ in the motivators they employ and the relationship they favour.13 
However each variant reflects the central thought of this approach: autonomy 
consists of a form of motivational self-reflection and control over the 
relationship between motivating phenomena.  
 
From this perspective, choice architecture can respect autonomy because it need 
not undermine the agent’s ultimate control over her motivations for action. 
Choice architects may structure a choice situation so that some reasons for 
action are easier to comply with (through personalised default rules) or more 
prominent (through prompting and framing). Each type of policy may make it 
                                                 
12 For the stronger claim that nudging may be required to respect autonomous choice, see 
Sunstein 2014a.  
13 See also Watson 1975; Young 1980; Dworkin 1988; Ekstrom 1993; Frankfurt 1998; Cuypers 
2000; Bratman 2003. 
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easier for the subject to act in line with her hierarchy of volitions. Accordingly, 
each example of choice architecture can be validated as non-heteronomous 
according to this conception. Further, I suggest that we are also entitled to the 
stronger claim that choice architecture can promote autonomy in this form 
because nudges can overcome causes of unreflective motivation. For example, 
choice architects may provide relevant information, prompt an individual to 
reflect upon that information and design rules that, in turn, help her to choose 
according to her own conception of the good in situations where she would have 
previously done otherwise. In these instances choice architecture increases 
instances of authentic behaviour, thus promoting personal autonomy. 
 
So on one popular account of personal autonomy, choice architecture can be 
argued to both respect and promote autonomy. Can the same be said for a 
conception of autonomy that eschews authenticity? In stark contrast to 
Frankfurt’s progenitive account stand relational accounts of personal autonomy. 
These often emphasise the social and relational aspects of personal autonomy 
(e.g. Freidman 2003, pp. 15-19) as more important than internal reflection and 
motivational control (Oshana 2005; 2007; Garnett 2013; 2014).14 Proponents 
argue either that personal autonomy is an inherently social capacity or that it is 
an individualistic capacity that requires a number of social conditions to be 
satisfied (Freidman 2003, p. 96). Either way the external conditions of autonomy 
dominate, especially our standing toward fellow agents. 
 
Can nudging respect autonomy in this form? I believe that it can. The examples of 
choice architecture I have suggested do not require domineering relationships 
between policy-maker and subject, nor do they force the subject into a form of 
subjugation. Though nudging (like all policy-making) requires a power 
asymmetry, not all power asymmetries are dominating. Thus not all policies that 
rely on these asymmetries display inherently objectionable forms of domination. 
Specifically, the opt-out condition prevents this from occurring. So long as the 
policies can be avoided, the subject’s opportunity to shape their life as they wish 
                                                 
14 See also Meyers 1989; Mackensie & Stoljar 2000; Oshana 2006. 
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(authentically or otherwise) is not diminished. Further, the provision of 
information can help break down social stigmas, reduce distrust caused by 
misinformation, and undermine harmful stereotypes by increasing awareness of 
the similarity of other’s circumstances. Such policies would do much to improve 
people’s social conditions. Nudges may even reduce the scale and number of 
dominating relationships by broadening information networks and increasing 
instances of meaningful choice, thus promoting autonomy in this form as well. 
 
5. The Epistemic Objection 
 
So far I have argued that a subset of nudges can be validated as non-
heteronomous and for this reason can respect the autonomous choice of agents. 
In this section I consider whether this claim is too simplistic. From the outset, my 
argument has relied on setting aside the question of motive to focus on assessing 
choice architecture as a means. I have suggested that i) personalisable default 
rules, ii) choice prompts, and iii) framed information provision, can each respect 
personal autonomy. A critic may agree with my criteria but object that the sorts 
of interventions that I propose fail to respect choice because they remain 
instances of a specific form of paternalism hitherto unconsidered – epistemic 
paternalism. Thus, even though the narrow range of nudges I have discussed are 
not strictly heteronomous in my use of the term, they still disrespect autonomy 
because they treat the individual as incapable of pursuing their own good. 
Specifically, they fail to respect the subject as a competent chooser by denying 
them the chance to make mistakes and be held responsible for the consequences. 
Reducing the risk of mistakes may appear prudent but could nonetheless 
infantilise individuals (e.g. Bovens 2009, p. 215). 
  
The charge of epistemic paternalism is a pressing one for choice architects. Our 
tendency for imperfect reasoning is matched by our overconfidence in our ability 
to make correct judgements. Choice architects are alive to this fact and seek to 
respond to it (e.g. Rachlinski 2003; Glaeser 2006; Blumenthal 2013). Policies 
designed to protect us from our cognitive failings (particularly in judgements of 
risk) have been criticised as yet another form of paternalism. Epistemic 
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paternalism constrains an individual’s methods of inquiry to improve her 
epistemic standing or facilitate her pursuit of veritistic ends (Goldman 1991, p. 
118). Common examples of such interferences are mandatory standards for good 
conduct in scientific and legal reasoning. The filtering of information (e.g. 
through principles such as anonymity) is intended to focus our faculties to 
increase the likelihood of making correct judgements. As a recent advocate puts 
it: ‘Epistemically paternalistic interventions are not designed to tell people what 
to believe, but how to come to believe things.’ (Ahlstrom-Vij 2013, p. 95).  
 
Because choice architecture seeks to harness our biases and improve our 
decisions, critics might suggest that it exhibits epistemically paternalistic 
tendencies, and that these tendencies fail to respect the choices of autonomous 
agents. This is particularly true for some of the policies I have championed as 
non-heteronomous, such as framing. The non-deceptive provision of information 
is a benchmark for respectful interaction because it does not attempt to 
undermine the voluntary and responsible conduct of the authentic will. Such 
interventions provide reasons to persuade an individual to act rather than 
coerce or manipulate them toward the same end; they intervene without 
interfering. Choice architects often frame information, and while the framing of 
information need not be deceptive, it is selective and intended to lead the subject 
toward particular outcomes. As such, it may constitute an epistemic threat to the 
autonomy of the subject. 
 
Epistemic paternalism constrains our options concerning information collection. 
This relationship is important both for those who recognise personal autonomy 
as a reflective capacity and for those who recognise it as a particular standing 
toward others. It directly threatens what we might call epistemic independence 
or epistemic self-reliance – our ability to pursue knowledge and seek truth in our 
own way. For the epistemic objection to hold, choice architecture must 
undermine epistemic independence and epistemic independence must be a 
necessary condition of personal autonomy. If this is the case, then choice 
architecture necessarily undermines the epistemic conditions of personal 
autonomy. 
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To respond to this worry I will determine whether my examples of non-
heteronomous nudges exert epistemic pressure and whether this pressure 
contravenes respect for personal autonomy. I suggest that although the answer 
to the former question is often yes, the answer to the crucial second question is 
no. 
 
Let us consider the descriptive point first. Why might we think that the instances 
of choice architecture that I have characterised as non-heteronomous exhibit 
epistemically paternalistic characteristics? Let us take my examples in turn:  
 
i) Personalised Default Rules – these policies need not apply to our 
collection and processing of information. But when they do, a rule will 
be epistemically paternalistic if an individual fails to personalise it, 
requiring the policy-maker to guide their decisions. The method of 
guidance will then determine the extent of the epistemic threat. 
 
ii) Choice Prompts – unguided prompts may actually increase the risk of 
mistaken decisions (making them counter-productive as a form of 
epistemic paternalism). Again, the extent to which prompts are 
epistemically paternalistic will be determined by whether and how 
the subject’s choices are guided by the policy-maker. 
 
iii) Framed Information Provision – such policies could be cases of 
epistemic paternalism because the information is selected and 
presented by the choice architect in a manner intended to guide the 
subject’s decision toward a particular goal in an unreflective manner. 
This may effectively distract the subject’s attention away from certain 
pieces of information and toward others, thus constraining the 
subject’s enquiry. 
 
A version of each policy that I offered as non-heteronomous in §3 appears to 
threaten epistemic paternalism. If epistemic paternalism is objectionable in 
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terms of respect for personal autonomy, then the options for the choice architect 
seeking to avoid wronging the subject are drastically reduced. Determining 
whether this is truly the case requires us to consider the level of constraint 
involved and the importance of epistemic independence to personal autonomy. 
 
Concerning constraints, let us again consider each policy in turn. As noted, a 
default rule will be epistemically paternalistic to the extent that the subject fails 
to personalise it. Personalisation is important to ensuring the first characteristic 
of good nudging. As such, a non-personalised default rule may be a bad nudge 
regardless. But crucially, the second characteristic of a good default rule, its opt-
out, will prevent the rule from completely constraining (and thus undermining) 
the subject’s epistemic independence. If the subject wants to proceed against a 
rule designed to reduce the risk of falsehood they will ultimately be able to do so. 
The rule can neither significantly change the costs of enquiry nor prevent the 
subject from opting-out. This ensures that even poorly designed default rules 
might not pose an objectionable epistemic threat. Well-designed default rules 
certainly should not. The same can be said for instances of guided or framed 
choice. These processes do not wholly inhibit an individual’s ability to pursue the 
truth. Rather they draw her attention away from certain pieces of information to 
emphasise others. So long as those other pieces of information are available 
(possibly as a part of the choice architect’s commitment to publicity) then the 
policies are validated. Making the subject work a little harder to access the 
information is unlikely to be a significant constraint; deceiving the subject by 
withholding that information is. As such, the epistemic problem closely mirrors 
that of heteronomy (Zagzebski 2012, p. 24). The response is similar – while 
intellectual dependence on others is compatible with self-rule, forced 
dependence isn’t. Because nudges allow the subject scope for personalisation 
and the potential to opt-out, they cannot force the subject into epistemic 
dependence. Thus, they do not conflict with either of the conceptions of 
autonomy from §4. 
 
I have argued that the suggested policies need not pose an overbearing threat to 
epistemic independence. Even if they (or other nudges) do, how important is 
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epistemic independence? It has been suggested that it is not a necessary 
condition of personal autonomy (Zagzebski 2012, pp. 24-26 & 250; Ahlstrom-Vij 
2013, pp. 65-90). While I generally accept this point, the issue is complicated by 
the fact that this relationship depends on the content of the individual’s goals. To 
some, epistemic independence will be an instrumental good. This is because the 
authentic pursuit of your conception of the good does not generally require you 
to independently learn everything you need for this pursuit. Rather, it requires 
you to learn various truths relevant to this pursuit, and you might better learn 
these truths though epistemically paternalistic acts.  
 
However, some individuals will value epistemic independence in itself and 
orientate their conception of the good toward it (e.g. the scientific enquirer). This 
increases the likelihood of a conflict between paternalism and autonomy. But 
even in these cases some interference will be acceptable. Placing great intrinsic 
value in epistemic independence threatens to commit oneself the burden of 
learning even basic truths for oneself. This cannot dominate an individual’s 
conception of the good as it conflicts with basic temporal constraints and more 
fundamental components of her conception that she would struggle to ignore 
(such as health, enjoyment, and personal relationships). Further, the relationship 
doesn’t always hold. Epistemic independence sometimes competes with 
autonomy because it may lead you to fail to learn the necessary truths, leaving 
you ignorant of your options (Fricker 2006; Ahlstrom-Vij 2013, pp. 92-108). 
 
Therefore, epistemic independence is unlikely to be of great importance to the 
many of us who are willing to be guided by or rely on others in our pursuit of our 
conception of the good. To those of whom it is of great importance, it cannot be 
of overbearing importance. Thus, epistemic dependence does not always 
contravene personal autonomy and, even when it appears to, some forms of 
dependence must be acceptable. Therefore, epistemically paternalistic 
interferences need not contravene personal autonomy, and accordingly the 
epistemic objection fails. Because of this, objections based on the supposed 
infantilisation of the subject must be based on some other ground.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
Having refuted both objections, I conclude that choice architecture can respect 
the autonomous will and authentic choice of the subject. In defending this claim, 
I hope to have defused a potential objection on epistemic grounds, provided a set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for choice architects to avoid the charge of 
heteronomy, and a compelling reason why policy-makers should avoid such 
policies in the first place. 
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